Report no:  2001/1

                                       B  U  R  U  N  D  I     R  E  P  O  R  T

                                                          April, 2001

POLARISATION OF PARTIES  INTO ‘WIN POWER’  AND  ‘KEEP  POWER’ CAMPS  THREATENS  THE  COLLAPSE  OF  PEACE  PROCESS

                                                    By  Jan VAN ECK

This analysis of the Burundian Peace Process is based on ongoing interaction and involvement with role-players of the different and opposing Burundian political and military parties-both inside and outside Burundi. The author is attached to the ‘Unit for Policy Studies’at ‘The Centre for International Policy Studies’ (CIPS), University of Pretoria.  Until end March 2001 he was consultant to the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town. (This is the first Burundi Report since May 2000; Report no.2000/2).

Overview:  The Way Forward.

Post-Arusha period requires ongoing negotiations, compromise and consensus.

            For Burundi to be able to break the present impasse and move forward, it is critical that the opposing role-players again realise that the peace-making and negotiations process did not end when they signed the Arusha Accord in August last year.

            In fact,  there is a need for them to confront the reality that Arusha was merely a first step towards establishing durable peace in Burundi, and that the daunting tasks which lie ahead in the post-Arusha period, will require as much - if not more - willingness to negotiate compromises and reach consensus, as Arusha did.

            The Arusha Accord did not produced the “promised land”, at best it has produced a road map showing the way to get there.  If it was argued that the holding of democratic elections in three years time would more likely be the signal that the “promised land”has been reached, then it needs to be remembered that those elections will only take place if ‘both sides’ in the conflict are willing to, as partners, wisely manage the transition in a spirit of compromise and consensus.

            The present spirit of ‘win-lose’ (victory for us, and defeat for them, has already resulted in the very impasse which is preventing the start of the transition. Until the parties change their approach, they will not be able to resolve the deadlock issues which they face and the impasse will continue.  

            Even during the present pre-transition period, the parties are unfortunately (for them) vividly demonstrating that they are not even capable of managing this period. No

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wonder that so many Barundi seriously question whether most of these parties can be

trusted with the task of leading their country through the transitional period at all? 

Can the parties manage a difficult transition?

            These very same parties would during a transitional period and a Transitional Government be confronted by much more formidable and daunting challenges.  Amongst these are e.g. the following:

            +  managing the return and resettlement of more than 600 000 refugees, and especially dealing with the highly emotive issues such as land claims, etc.(the way this issue was managed in 1993 seems to have contributed to the crisis);        

            +  continuing with the negotiations for a comprehensive military and political agreement with the two excluded armed movements;

            +  transforming the Burundian Army:  while the Arusha parties agreed to a 50/50 Hutu/Tutsi ratio for the reformed Burundian Army, it did not specify ‘which Hutus’ should comprise the 50% Hutu component, e.g. the 35% Hutus presently already in the Army, or the Hutus belonging to those armed movements which have already stopped the war (CNDD, PALIPEHUTU and FROLINA) or those who are still fighting (CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL (once they join the peace process) - or a combination of all of them?  

            +  re-incorporation of the mainly Hutu exiled leaders (both political and military),   including the ‘rebellions’, who have - due to the war and their presence outside the country - been dangerously demonised inside Burundi;

            +  managing the potentially substantial resistance from the Tutsi ‘hardliners’, who  question some key agreements reached in the Arusha Accord, do not accept ‘Frodebu’ as a legitimate negotiating partner and would not be truly willing to negotiate any new compromises with the armed Hutu movements;  dealing with these ‘hardliners’ in a way which will not take Burundi backwards, will necessitate skillful leadership; 

            +  managing the internal security situation, while the war intensifies and while all indications are that the regional ethnic conflict (temporarily submerged by the Congolese war) is resurfacing and is already directly impacting on Burundi;   

            From the above observations it should be clear that the Transition will face formidable challenges/obstacles, which will test both the willingness and ability of the parties to negotiate to the limit. Most of these issues - if not managed in a spirit of compromise and consensus - have the capacity of destabilising Burundi even further and thus derailing the whole peace process.

Transition requires a stable government.

            Burundi therefore needs a Transitional Government which will, both in composition and in spirit, resemble a kind of government of national unity, i.e. a government which will have an agreed-upon common vision of a future Burundi, will include the two primary opposing forces, will accept that the two sides will only be able

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to move forward if they both remain willing to negotiate, ‘to give’ and compromise - as the evolving Burundian realities on the ground demand.

            But such an inclusive government of national unity will remain a pipedream while some parties dream that ‘victory’ and ‘defeat of the enemy’ is imminent when the Transitional Government is appointed. (Some of these dreams can easily turn into nightmares).

            Neither Tutsi or  Hutu ‘won’ in Arusha, and neither side ‘lost’.  That is the hard reality.  It was a ‘win-win’ compromise.  For some parties to now want to turn this ‘win-win’ into a ‘win-lose’ outcome, is playing with fire.  The only workable way forward is to continue on the same ‘win-win’ basis.  Any signs that the other party is now unilaterally changing the rules and instead going for victory, will at the very least elicit an equivalent response from the other side and will undo everything accomplished thus far. If the parties do not continue to demonstrate a willingness to continue implementing the transition in this spirit of negotiating, making compromises and reaching consensus, it will be very unlikely that these parties will be allowed to implement the transition.  

            Since the Transitional Government will also provide provide an acid test of  whether Hutu and Tutsi can actually (eventually) develop enough trust and confidence in one another to successfully administer the country together, a big responsibility rests on the shoulders of those who have implement this Government. Another failure, which is imminent while this present ‘win-lose’ attitude previals, will yet again ‘prove’ that this goal is not achievable. This would merely push Burundi even further back towards the traditional war option.

            If a Transitional Government, due to the weakness of its composition, should again become seriously paralysed (as happened to the Hutu/Tutsi Convention of Government, in 1996),  it would also very likely result in ‘other forces’ to intervene to either prevent the potentially disastrous consequences which a failed process would have or to impose another ‘solution’.          

An unstable transition and the Army.

            But, as the armed movements have always pointed out, it is useless to speculate about what is possible in Burundi unless one takes into consideration what the sentiments and inclinations of the Burundian Army are. 

            People have frequently accused the Burundian armed movements of trying to ‘keep the (Arusha) process hostage’ by e.g. not yet having joined a ceasefire process). Yes, they do indeed keep the process hostage -  merely because they have the capacity to continue the war as long as they are excluded .  In the same veign, the Burundian Army has - in theory - always had the same power to keep the peace process hostage. If they had e.g. completely rejected the Arusha Process, they could have stopped it in its tracks.  These are the realities of the Burundian military/ethnic conflict.

            It would seem that ‘the Army’, as an enitity, subscribes to some fundamental positions which broadly-speaking determines its behaviour, also at the present time:

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            +  it supports reform and transformation, but at a pace which ensures stability and security;

            +  it wants to end the war, and will therefore support talks/negotiations with the armed movements - but not at all costs;

            +  it is willing to integrate members of the armed movements into the Burundian Army, but on condition that new recruits meet certain (agreed-upon) professional standards.

            With regard to the present impasse in Burundi it is clear that the Burundi Army views (what is called) the ‘exploitative’, ‘polarising’, ‘dishonest’ and ‘selfish’ behaviour of the Burundian ‘political class’, with growing contempt.  In fact, if military coups were still internationally ‘acceptable’,  the Army would under the present circumstances actually oust virtually the whole political class and get on with the job of introducing the necessary reforms and ending the war itself . (For further elaboration on reasons for coups in Africa, see Ali A. Mazrui:  Nationalism and New States in Africa, 1984). 

            For this reason it is very unlikely that any “adventurist” within the ‘political class’ would succeed in getting any significant support from the Army for any attempt to further destabilise Burundi - as the failed coup of 18 April illustrated.

            As the impasse continues, as the war continues to escalate and as the risk of serious destabilisation in Burundi and the region increases, Army support for the Government and the various State institutions is likely to grow.  (With regard to President Buyoya, their attitude will most likely be that ‘he is by far the best of a bad bunch’).

            Within this context it remains true to say that Burundi will go where the Army (and those politicians who control it) goes.

Note from the author:

The analysis and comments contained in this Report are as frank and honest as possible.  It was felt that during the present extremely critical times, it was essential for someone  who has for nearly six years had the privelege of having extremely frank personal discussions with such a wide variety of role-players, to be equally frank. This Report is therefore based on nothing more than those frank discussions.

             But, while they were willing to be frank with a South African, this still does not seem to be the case when it comes to interaction between Burundians themselves.  The following (loosely quoted)  Burundian saying sums it up well: 

            “You know that I am not telling the truth -

              but you hide the fact that you know that”. 

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1.  A Political  Impasse:  ‘Win-win replaced by ‘win-lose’ approach.

When the Arusha Process started, the political parties were still very much locked into a ‘win-lose’ mindset, the very mindset which had fuelled the conflict for decades and had prevented its resolution. It was the continuation of this mindset which prevented the parties from making any substantive progress during the first few years of negotiations. 

            Only once the new International Facilitator, former President Nelson Mandela, early in 2000, “shocked” the negotiating parties by telling them that he expected them to sign an Accord “within a few months”,  did they realise that they would never be able to  fulfil this expectation of the Facilitator unless they tried to adopt more of a ‘win-win’ (i.e. compromise) approach.

            Although this new approach was therefore mainly adopted for tactical reasons and was clearly not subscribed to with equal enthusiasm by all the parties, it did result in the parties eventually signing the Arusha Accord on 28th August 2000.

            The fact that virtually all parties either publicly or privately expressed reservations about the Accord, either during or after the signing, was a warning that the Arusha Accord was in actual fact a very fragile agreement and that much more would have to be done to make it truly viable.

            Seven months later the Burundian peace process has reached an extremely serious impasse. There is a virtual total absence of consensus amongst the key role-players about how the peace process in general, and the Arusha Accord in specific should be taken forward under the present extremely unstable and volatile circumstances. It is indeed the most serious crisis which Burundi has experienced since the author arrived in1995).

            This is creating a dangerous vacuum which, judging by past experience, can very easily be filled by various ‘adventurists’-both Burundian and regional. (While this report was being written, a failed coup attempt took place in Burundi on 18 April. Although only a small group was involved, their actions do however represent the sentiments of a much larger section of an increasingly fearful Tutsi population). 

            If the attitude amongst the signatory parties does not change and if the impasse continues, more serious attempts to derail the process can be expected from those elements - both Tutsi and Hutu ‘hardliners - who reject the whole process for different reasons.      

1.1  Arusha principles of ‘win-win’ and compromise ‘no longer apply’.

This inability to reach consensus on the way forward is the direct result of virtually all signatory parties having again succumbed to the ‘traditional win-lose approach’. ‘Demonising’ your opponent, and talk of  ‘defeating the enemy’ is again the vogue.

            The impression is created that parties believe that, since they signed the Arusha Accord, they can now use the post-Arusha transition period to achieve what they could

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not achieve in Arusha, i.e. victory (for themselves) and defeat (for their enemy). This desire to ‘defeat the enemy’ demonstrates itself in signs of wanting to ‘take power’ (amongst some Hutu role-players), and the corresponding response of ‘keeping power’ (amongst some Tutsi role-players). This is the classical ‘win-lose’ approach and the antithesis of negotiating a mutually acceptable compromise agreement.  Whether parties realise it or not, it can only lead to a ‘lose-lose’ outcome for all Burundians.

            While parties and key role-players stick to this ‘win-lose’ approach, this dangerous impasse will continue and political and ethnic polarisation will increase. Unless the parties end this deadlock, it will be impossible to successfully implement the Arusha Accord under these circumstances.

1.2  Aspects of the Arusha Process which contributed to this ‘win-lose’ approach.

In spite of the good intentions of the chief architects of the Arusha Process, certain aspects and developments during this process undermined the commitment amongst parties to compromise and kept the option of ‘victory’ and ‘win-lose’ alive.  Amongst these were:

            +   The exclusion of the two main armed movements. .

The ongoing exclusion/absence of the CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL  from the Arusha process, accompanied by the resultant war and killings (frequently ethnically-motivated), ensured that a psychological ‘war mindset’ (i.e. ‘win-lose’) continued to prevail amongst negotiating parties on both sides. The ongoing war also resulted in some role-players believing that if they could not achieve their real objectives at Arusha, the two armed movements - by continuing with the war - would help them to get their victory at a later stage.

            +   The exclusion of the Tutsi ‘hardline’ from the process. .

While it is true that most of these groupings chose to exclude themselves from the process, it is also true that after Mandela announced that the agreement would have to be signed ‘soon’, they made many efforts to communicate their opposition and concerns.  Although Mandela did try to engage them, the time-table was too far advanced at that stage for them and their concerns to be accommodated in a substantive way. With the  process now moving towards implementation of an Arusha Accord which they reject and from which they were excluded, they have developed a vested interested in derailing the process - by force if there is no other alternative.  Although they did not participate during Arusha, many of the Tutsi parties at Arusha tried to bring the opinions of these ‘hardliners’ to the attention of the negotiators at Arusha, but were ignored. 

            Serious consideration needs to be given to bring some of these role-players closer to, and more involved in, the peace process.  If nothing is done to address this problem within the Tutsi community, they will remain a serious potential destabilising force in the

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days ahead - as happened in 1993 when some Tutsi role-players used elements in the Army to assassinate President Ndadaye.   

            +   The weakening of the two main opposing forces as a team. .

Arusha should have strengthened the (Tutsi-led) Burundian Government and the (Hutu-led) FRODEBU party if it had been accepted that the Burundian problem could basically have been solved if these two main opposing forces had been able to reach agreement. 

The smaller parties, as happened in other negotiations processes,  should have been helped to realise that they should have aligned themselves broadly-speaking with one of the two main players. Instead of doing this, Arusha actually allowed the two key players to be undermined by treating the many small parties - even some totally irrelevant ones - as equals (‘kingmakers’). The creation of the so-called G10 and G7 groupings also directly contributed to this. Although the Burundi Government was most seriously affected, FRODEBU also suffered from this.

            (When the Arusha facilitation organised a series of ‘Dar es Salaam Consultations’,  to which only the six ‘key players/parties’ were invited, much more progress was made than at Arusha.  These Consultations were however stopped due to pressure from the other smaller parties).  

            The result is that we now have a situation where small parties believe that they actually have the ability to exclude the Government from the Transitional Government.        

            +   The creation and strengthening of ‘multi-ethnic’ alliances.

In a naive belief that the formation of multi-ethnic alliances would (as such) overcome  the destructive Burundian ethnic divide, the formation of multi-ethnic alliances were encouraged and strengthened by the Arusha Process.  This was even done when it was clear that the alliance partners had no common vision of the future and were merely being formed to mobilise  “negative consensus”.  

            +   Leaving the critical issues of ‘genocide’ and ‘Putsch’ unresolved, prevented trust-building. .

The Arusha Process allowed the parties to side-step the most emotional and divisive issues in Burundian politics, i.e. the ‘Putsch’ of 1993 (during which the newly-elected Hutu President and many other senior Hutu office-bearers were assassinated), the subsequent ‘Genocide” (during which more than 100 000 Tutsis were killed by Hutus, in revenge) and the retaliatory killings of even more Hutus by the Burundian Army.  As a result, both Hutu and Tutsi still believe that the other side will, when given the chance (e.g. during a transitional government?), repeat what they did before.  Until these issues have been dealt with and until each side believes that the other side will no longer  support such crimes, it will remain impossible to build real trust.  And without trust no real durable agreements can be negotiated.

            +   The Arusha Process produced no rewards for the negotiating parties. 

Arusha was from the outset ‘contested territory’, with both sides ‘agreeing’ that both the

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venue of negotiations (Arusha) and the host country producing the Facilitator, (Tanzania) were partisan.  Hutus were openly saying that Tanzania, ‘Mwalimu’ Nyerere and members of the Facilitation Team were supporting them, while Tutsis were equally adamant that they were negotiating in ‘enemy territory’. 

            More seriously, the blanket and untargeted sanctions applied by the region, at the request of the then Facilitator, in spite of the fact that the Government was indeed negotiating and had even been willing to create a split the Tutsi community as a result, and the failure of the Arusha peace process to produce at least some positive results such as a cessation of hostilities and economic assistance,  undermined not only the credibility of the whole process, but also that of those parties who were willing to continue negotiating.  Amongst the Tutsi community the Government lost most, with significant numbers of Tutsis joining parties opposed to Arusha.

            If Arusha had been more sensitive to the Burundian political environment, it would have produced more ‘carrots’ (encouragement) instead of only ‘sticks’ (punishment).  The opposition to the Government and the peace process as a whole, would have been far less than it is today.  If for example, there were today real signs that an end to the war was indeed becoming realisable, a large percentage of Tutsi supporters who abandoned the Government and the Peace Process, would change their minds. .

            +   Regional role-players continued to promise certain parties victory.

This role played by certain regional role-players had an extremely debilitating effect on the whole process.  Some parties were continuously told that they would be helped to ‘defeat’ their enemies at Arusha and that they would come out of the process as ‘victors’.  Being promised victory, undermined the willingness of these parties to seriously engage their enemies/opponents in the search for viable compromise solutions. (It is not the task of the author to identify these role-players, except to say it was mainly individual role-players who were guilty of this practise and not generally-speaking regional governments).

            +  Attempts by Arusha Process to sink the Internal Partnership.

The formation of the Internal Partnership between the UPRONA-supported Government of Pres. Buyoya and the internal component of the largest Hutu party FRODEBU in 1998, was considered by a large cross-section of both Hutu and Tutsi as a positive step forward.  It was made possible by a significant shift in the average Tutsi opinion since Buyoya took power in 1996 - away from a ‘ant-negotiations’ position towards a ‘let us try and see if negotiations can work’ position. 

            Although this Partnership could obviously not become a substitute or alternative for ‘all-inclusive’ negotiations (at Arusha), it was indeed a serious attempt by moderate elements within each opposing camp to see if it would be possible for them to negotiate a mutually acceptable type of limited power-sharing agreement.  It was in essence an attempt to convince one another that Hutu and Tutsi were indeed able to find common ground. Aware of the fact that a significant section of Tutsi leadership had adopted a new

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and more positive position with regard to negotiations, the FRODEBU leadership wisely allowed its leadership to participate.

            After lengthy, extremely frank and, at times, heated debates, the parties eventually agreed on the Internal Partnership, i.e. a new multi-ethnic ‘power-sharing’ Government and a kind of ‘interim/amended constitution’. However small this step may have been seen by outsiders, for the Burundians from the two opposing sides, who had been involved in it, this was a very significant moment.  The day the Partnership was formally adopted and signed (in a packed National Assembly) the parties glowed with pride. They were saying:  this is a truly Burundian product, produced by Burundians and for Burundians -  without any foreign help.

            In spite of this success it was not seen by the signatories as “the” solution but merely as an essential step in building more trust and confidence between the main parties, UPRONA and FRODEBU.

            Sadly, the Facilitator, Mwalimu Nyerere, and other regional role-players such as  Pres. Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, did not see it this way.  They perceived this Partnership instead as “a clever attempt by Buyoya and the ‘Bururi Tutsi’ to evade all-inclusive regionally-organised negotiations at Arusha”.  In the full knowledge that many Arusha negotiating parties would reject this Internal Partnership, a campaign was launched to force the parties to sign the Partnership Agreement in Arusha (instead of in Bujumbura). Such was the pressure from regional players - even on the day of signing - that the signing was delayed by a couple of hours. One top FRODEBU leader was even told by a senior regional role-player:  “If you sign the Internal Partnership, you will become a traitor to the Hutu cause”.  As a result of the divisions caused over this Partnership through direct regional intervention, FRODEBU split into the Minani and Nzojibwami wings.  (UPRONA had already before the Internal Partnership negotiations split into a pro- and anti-negotiations wing).

            Although the regional opponents of the Partnership won (?), and the parties were not able to continue building on the foundation laid, the Partnership (in Government and in the National Assembly) has continued to administer Burundi until today.

            There is no doubt that opposition to the Partnership re-kindled the ethnic divisions and fuelled a win-lose approach.

1.3  The present impasse over transitional leadership.  

In view of the above analysis it is therefore no surprise that the whole issue of who should lead the new Transitional Government (in terms of the Arusha Accord) has turned into a kind of election campaign to defeat both the present Government and the current President, Pierre Buyoya.  While the campaign has merely focused on the person of Pres. Buyoya, very few participants in this campaign have paid any attention to what the new

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Transitional President would have to do, and which candidate would therefore be best equipped to do this.

            It is quite natural that opposition parties, such as FRODEBU (and it’s G6 mainly Hutu Alliance), would be inclined to use any opportunity to oust its long-standing opponent, and would even join an alliance of anti-Buyoya Tutsi parties to achieve this. Whether it is wise to do it at this sensitive stage of the peace process, is another matter.

            One needs however to look more seriously at the reasons why the alliance of anti-Buyoya Tutsi Parties, (G6/7/8), want to replace him with their own (Tutsi) candidate,  in order to be able to evaluate whether replacing Buyoya will actually increase or decrease the chances of reaching ‘rapprochement’ between the Hutu and Tutsi ‘sides’.  After lengthy discussions with numerous role-players over many months, it is clear that the following are amongst the reasons why these anti-Buyoya parties reject Buyoya:

            +  he is too moderate/democratic;

            +  he is too sensitive to international opinion - at the expense of Tutsi security,

                e.g. agreeing to dismantle regroupment camps, etc.;

            +  he agreed to democratisation in 1992/3 (which led to the ‘genocide’),  

                and wants to do it (democratise) again with the Arusha Accord;

            +  he will negotiate an even more democratic (Arusha) accord with the rebels;

            +  he protects/refuses to prosecute those Hutus who committed ‘genocide’;

            +  he prevented the Tutsi militias in Bujumbura from ‘taking action’ against

                guilty Hutus;

            +  he instructed the Army to fight the rebels without killing (Hutu) civilians;

            +  he continued with Arusha even when we opposed it and when it was ‘loaded’                

                against us.

            It should be clear that the actions for which these Tutsi parties criticise Buyoya needs are exactly the kind of  actions which should be expected from the first President of the Transition - if the transition is to succeed.

            A significant percentage of the parties who oppose Buyoya are doing so because they feel that the Arusha Accord has gone ‘too far’, i.e. not only giving the Hutu parties ‘too much power’ in government and parliament, but also and especially within the Army, where Hutu and Tutsi will be represented on a 50/50 basis (according to Arusha).  While Buyoya’s main opponent from within the Tutsi community, Col. Epitace Bayaganakandi may have all the right intentions, most of those who support him intend to use the new Transitional Government to FRODEBU.  (They accuse FRODEBU as either being ‘genocidal’ or, at least, ‘harbouring ‘genocidaire’ within it’s top leadership and intend to marginalise it).

            If the anti-Buyoya Tutsi lobby, which has chosen to throw their weight behind Col. Bayaganakandi, should take power in the new Transitional Government, it will quite simply use its power to change the Arusha Accord back towards Tutsi ‘control’.

            And while they have the undeniable right to aspire to this (and even have the right

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to demand that Arusha as a whole needs to be reconstituted and renegotiated), this objective should at least be publicly known.            

            In view of the fact that the objectives of FRODEBU are quite the opposite of Bayaganakandi’s supporters (FRODEBU actually hopes that future negotiations will produce an even more democratic constitution), any Transitional Government led by both Col. Epitace Bayaganakandi and the FRODEBU candidate, Domitien Ndayizeye, would not only create a totally divided and paralysed Government, but would also signal the end of any transition to democracy. While FRODEBU is not unaware of this danger - even of the incompatibility of its ‘partner’, it seems to believe that the international community, led by Mandela, will ‘prevent the Tutsis from doing what they did in 1993’. This is a forlorn hope.

 1.4  Who should lead the Transition?

  In virtually all successful negotiations the two main parties involved in the negotiations process, i.e. those who are ‘in power’ and those who are ‘excluded from power’, lead the Transition.  (E.g. in South Africa this meant that primarily the Apartheid Government and the African National Congress had to constitute the new Government of National Unity - whether everyone liked it or not.  Trying to use the negotiations process to exclude the Apartheid Government - which many people in the ANC wanted to do, contrary to Mandela’s opinion - would have led to total failure).

            In the Burundian context this means that those who have the power (the Burundian Government/UPRONA), and those who lost the power in 1993 (FRODEBU)  should be the main components of a multi-party Transitional Government.  (Besides the fact that it is impossible to force the present Government to abdicate in terms of the Arusha principles of consensus, it would also not be advisable). 

            Since the Arusha negotiating process was supposed to end the decades-long policy of exclusion, it would be nothing less than sabotage of the whole principle of inclusivity, for the Government (which presently controls all state institutions) to now be excluded.  To use the transition merely for creating a new excluded class, would sow the seeds for long-term instability. 

            Instead of indulging in a furious debate about which individuals should lead the Transition, parties should instead - through consensus and compromise - reach agreement on the principle that the two main opposing power blocks (who are responsible for starting both the conflict and the negotiations), will be the main components of the Transitional Government. It would seem that nothing else will work.

            Once the principle, that the Government should be one of the two key partners in the new Transitional Government, has been accepted, the deadlock will be broken.  Until then the Government has the power and the right (in terms of the Arusha principle of consensus decision-taking) to block the installation of a Transitional Government. 

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Compared to the alliance of anti-Buyoya Tutsi parties it is evident that the Tutsi-led Government and the government-supporting wing of the largest Tutsi party UPRONA, still have the biggest commitment to the Arusha Accord and the spirit of compromise contained in it,  and the need to negotiate an inclusive cease-fire with the two armed rebellions. It would also seem to be in a better position to retain the relative unity of the Burundian Army and thus ensure a relatively stable transition towards democratic elections three years from now.  

Recommendation regarding the Leadership issue made by the February Regional Summit held in Arusha.

During this Regional Summit it was recommended that the so-called G10 (Tutsi parties) and the G7 (Hutu parties) respectively nominate the President and Vice-President for the Transition.  A strict interpretation of this wording would imply that two of the main signatories of the Arusha Accord are excluded, i.e. the Government and the National Assembly.. 

            It is however understood that the original wording was that the ‘Tutsi and Hutu negotiating parties’(totalling 19), should nominate consensus candidates for these positions.  When objections were raised to this ethnic terminology, the wording  G10 (Tutsi) and G7 (Hutu) was used instead.  The intention was therefore not, as the present wording implies, to exclude the Government and National Assembly from this decision regarding the Transitional leadership. (Note:  Two of the G10 Tutsi parties do not oppose Pres. Buyoya:  UPRONA, the largest Tutsi party  (which supports him), and PARENA, a Tutsi party led by a former President, Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, (which does not support either candidates).  One of the G7 Hutu parties, the CNDD of Mr. Leonard Nyangoma, does not oppose Buyoya’s candidature).

1.5  A risky regional power struggle between north and south.

It has been evident for some time that there is a serious power struggle developing between the South (especially the province of Bururi, which has to a large extent monopolised power since 1965), and the North, or the ‘non-South’ and ‘non-Bururi’(which has to some extent been marginalised).  Due to the fact that most positions in the Army and in the civil service have for decades been filled by those from the South, the North has always felt that it was being treated as second class.

            While this is probably true, it needs to be questioned whether it is wise, the right time, to use what is already an extremely difficult transition from ‘Tutsi power’ to ‘Tutsi-Hutu power-sharing’, to address this imbalance?    

            Hutu and Tutsi role-players from the North have been forming multi-ethnic

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alliances to strengthen their ability to wrest power away from the South.  Although it is understandable that the Northern region would want a better share of the cake, it is doubtful whether forming multi-ethnic alliances between parties which have nothing politically in common except to take power away from the South, will create stability.

            As mentioned earlier, the concept of Transition requires those who do not have power to cooperate with those who do - in this case the North and South respectively - with the objective of creating a more equitable dispensation afterwards.  To threaten the South with a loss of power (and everything which that implies) merely results in the South forming its own tactical multi-ethnic alliances - to hold on to power. This North versus South struggle for power can potentially be extremely destabilising if it is borne in mind that most of the Burundian Army comes from the South.

            But not only political parties are getting involved in this north/south power struggle, even armed movements are allegedly following this trend. The split within the PALIPEHUTU-FNL is also ascribed to a north/south divide while the CNDD-FDD also shows a northern dominance (in spite of its leader Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye being from the south).  As result, the CNDD leader, Leonard Nyangoma, from whom the FDD broke away, is now mainly recruiting members from the south). 

            (One of the multitude of rumours circulating in Bujumbura is the following:   That the different northern and southern multi-ethnic alliances are not only busy mobilising their political parties, but also their own armies, i.e. (1) the (bulk of the) Burundian Army, the CNDD,  PALIPEHUTU-FNL (the Cossan Kabura-wing),  for the South and  (2)  the CNDD/FDD,  PALIPEHUTU-FNL (the Agathon Rwasa-wing) and a section of the Burundian Army, for the North).    

2.  Military Impasse:  Ongoing war promotes ‘win-lose’ mindset.

The exclusion of the two main armed movements (the CNDD-FDD, led by Col. Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, which has recently split into two factions, led by Cossan Kabura and Agathon Rwasa respectively), has been and continues to be the ‘Achilles heel’ of the whole Arusha Process.  The former Facilitator, ‘Mwalimu’ Nyerere refused to include them unless they first either re-united with the movements from which they broke away (CNDD and PALIPEHUTU), or changed their names.  This was in spite of the fact that a cease-fire signed in Arusha in June 1998 by all the Arusha parties, did not produce any results. In February 2000, the new Facilitator, former President Nelson Mandela, announced - in spite of strong opposition - that he was going to include them. 

            Both armed movements continue to demonstrate that they have the capacity to seriously destabilise the country - including the capital Bujumbura - and virtually prevent any Peace Accord from being successfully implemented.

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2.1  War also polarises ‘Arusha’ politicians and the population.

At a stage when attempts are still being made to include the two armed movements in a cease-fire process, the war is not only continuing unabated but is actually escalating.  The inevitable result is that the option of  forcibly ousting the Government and ‘taking power’(and the inevitable counter-response of using force to ‘keep power), again takes precedence, while the alternative of negotiating a peace agreement is  moved to the backburner. 

            But the war does not only polarise the military belligerents into ‘warring camps’. The political belligerents, including the parties who negotiated at Arusha and who are now supposed to implement the Accord in a spirit of compromise and consensus, do not escape the effects of this war psychosis.

            It is generally accepted that, while most Tutsis sympathise with the mainly Tutsi Burundian Army (which they see as guaranteeing their physical safety),  Hutus in general sympathise with at least the political objectives of the mainly Hutu armed movements.  While the war continues, this ethnic solidarity with ‘opposing armies’ will continue to grow and will increasingly militarise the conflict.  In the process politicians and political parties will become completely marginalised. This scenario is further aggravated by the fact that the Burundian ethnic conflict is simultaneously accompanied by and ongoing regional ethnic conflict.  

            It would indeed take an extremely solid and durable peace agreement to overcome the dangerously polarising effects such a war has on a nation already deeply divided along ethnic, political and regional lines. The fragile and deeply contested Arusha Accord just does not measure up to this task.      

2.2  The cease-fire process: No real progress.

Since former President Mandela expressed his intention to include the two armed movements in the peace process, most attempts to create a viable ‘cease-fire process’ have until now - more than one year later - not succeeded.  This is in spite of the fact that South African Deputy-President, Jacob Zuma, was appointed by the Facilitator to facilitate this process between the two armed movements and the Burundian Government/Army on his behalf.  In spite of numerous attempts to bring the three belligerents together in face-to-face talks, there is presently yet no realistic prospect of either a cessation of hostilities or even a (temporary) truce.

            On the contrary, while these attempts to start a cease-fire process have continued, both armed movements have actually seriously escalated their military operations in Burundi. The recent attacks on the Burundian capital Bujumbura by the FNL, and its ten-day occupation of the suburb Kinama, seems to be a sign of things to come. Reports of

                                                                   15.

large-scale movements of armed groups from both Tanzania and the DRC into central and north-western Burundi, possibly with the support of other regional anti-Tutsi militias,  indicate  that the armed movements are planning a major military offensive inside Burundi - in spite of present attempts to start a cease-fire process.

            This state of affairs is slowly but surely destroying the hope amongst Burundians that the ‘Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Accord’ will actually achieve what its main objective is supposed to be: ending the war and bringing real peace to the country. If this hope is further destroyed the Arusha Accord will lose whatever legitimacy it may still have.

            Unless efforts are urgently intensified to ensure the involvement of  two armed movements in a new negotiating process, the time for talking will run out. 

2.2.1  Have the armed groups had a fair chance to join the new cease-fire process?

The Burundian Government/Army has from the outset visibly demonstrated its commitment to face-to-face talks with the armed groups by sending senior delegations to every ‘cease-fire’ meeting arranged by Mandela or Zuma - even when the armed groups failed to turn up, or when internal opposition mounted.

            The ability to start such a process therefore depends solely on including the armed movements.

            Having been intensively involved in interacting with the two armed rebellions, and informally assisting Mandela and Zuma in their attempts to arrange meetings with them during most of last year, the author has no choice but to state that these movements have not yet been given a fair chance to join a comprehensive cease-fire process.

            While both Mandela and Zuma did have a number of separate in-depth meetings with both movements last year,  many attempts failed.  Although it is true that the two movements could possibly have done more themselves to initiate such a process, most of the fault lies with those who had to ensure that the two groups attended their meetings with Mandela and Zuma.

            During most of last year the two groups continued to raise numerous complaints with regard to the way these meetings were organised, e.g.:   + they were not consulted before-hand about planned dates for meetings;   + they did not receive invitations;  + invitations arrived too late;  +  travel arrangements and documents were not arranged properly;  +  some of the organisers of the meetings treated them ‘with contempt’, were openly ‘partisan’ and ‘hostile’ to them, etc. (numerous complaints about these individuals were formally lodged both with Mandela and Zuma);  +  some persons were actively trying to prevent them from joining cease-fire process.  

            By the end of last year it became clear that all these negative aspects of the process, was also starting to negatively affect their perception of  Mandela and Zuma  and that they were as a result losing confidence in the process.  A number of statements

                                                                   16.

made by Mandela, e.g. at the Paris Donor’s Conference, in which he was extremely critical and condemnatory about their behaviour, further contributed to this.  While they were still willing to continue under the facilitation of Zuma, this also now seems to be undergoing a change.  This is indeed a very worrying development.

2.2.2  Good news from Libreville.

On January 9, 2001 the only good news thus far in the cease-fire process came (unexpectedly) from the Gabon capital, Libreville.  Senior delegations of the Burundian Government/Army and the CNDD-FDD armed movement, respectively led by Pres. Pierre Buyoya and Col. Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, had their first ever face-to-face talks in Libreville, Gabon.  This meeting was arranged by the Burundian parties, former Pres. Laurent Kabila of the DRC and Pres.Omar Bongo of Gabon.  Although both Mandela and Zuma were not directly involved in this meeting, both were informed before hand and expressed their full support for this initiative. Both parties committed themselves to continue with the talks started in Libreville.

            After two subsequent attempts to arrange Libreville 2 failed (one planned for Cape Town in February,  and one in Libreville in March, the parties eventually met again in Libreville on 17 and 18 April.  It would seem that some serious misunderstandings developed between the CNDD-FDD and Deputy-President Zuma with regard to whether their process was part of the Arusha Process or not, and whether, what they called, ‘The Libreville Process’ had now replaced Arusha.

2.2.3  How the armed movements view a new cease-fire process.

In devising a cease-fire process which will be supported by the armed movements, cognisance needs to be taken the positions they hold with regard to such a process, need to be taken into consideration:

            +   they have no interest in the Arusha Accord and are not willing to merely complete a document which has already been signed by 19 parties;

            +   they want the cease-fire process to be a totally new process (separate from Arusha) between themselves and the other two belligerents;

            +   they want to be given the same opportunity as the other nineteen Arusha Parties to negotiate a new dispensation for Burundi;  

            +   they only want to negotiate with what they term “the power”, i.e. primarily the Burundian Army (and those politicians who control it), and are not interested in negotiating with any other ‘Arusha’ parties;

            +   they insist that they be given the right to negotiate both political and military issues, instead of merely being asked to deal with a cease-fire;

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            +   they insist that all observers be agreed to by the three parties; specific persons involved in the Facilitation are identified as not being welcome;

            +   while they ignore the Arusha Accord, they however accept the fact that if they should reach  agreements with the Government/Army which differ from the Arusha Accord, that they would then have to engage the Arusha Parties to reach a broader consensus.               

2.2.4  Growing support for military action against armed movements.  

Due to the fact that the cease-fire process is not producing any tangible results, more and more Burundians, as well as external role-players, are coming to the conclusion that the armed movements do not want to negotiate peace. 

            This is resulting in people starting to consider alternative strategies (to a cease-fire process) whereby these movements can be ‘militarily neutralised’.  It is however extremely unlikely that any such military ‘solutions’ will produce peace.

            One of the options being considered is that the Lusaka Accord should be implemented, specifically the provision which states that specifically identified ‘negative forces’ which are operating from the DRC should be arrested, disarmed, ‘encamped’ and repatriated. The Head of the UN operation in the DRC (MONUC), has indicated that this process could actually start by the middle of May this year.  It is however very unlikely that these so-called negative forces will sit and wait to be arrested.

            A second option is that the international community be requested yet again to exert pressure on both the Tanzanian and DRC Governments to prevent armed movements and other militias from using their territory to launch attacks into Burundi.  Again, the prospects of this succeeding do not seem very good.  Joseph Kabila, the new DRC President, told Burundian President Pierre Buyoya during their meeting in Libreville on 17 April that “there were no Burundian rebels operating from eastern Congo”.  This is obviously not a true reflection of the reality.  Virtually everyone knows  that the CNDD-FDD are officially part of the Kinshasa Alliance, that they have operated in Katanga and South Kivu and that they have their main headquarters in Lubumbashi.

            With regard to ‘pressurising’ Tanzania to stop armed movements from using its territory (and the Burundian refugee camps) as launching pads for attacks into Burundi, numerous similar attempts in the past have failed dismally. 

            The facts with regard to these refugee camps are as follows:  +  they are as close as 5 km from the Burundian border, resulting in armed groups easily using them to cross the border into Burundi and come back without being seen;  +  they are being actively used to recruit fighters (according to a Tanzanian Minister) and as military operational centres (according to the Burundian armed movements). 

            This issue has been a source of serious tension between the Tanzanian and Burundian Government for at least six years.  At times both countries deployed troops

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along their common border when there were rumours that Burundians soldiers were going to cross the border in order to pursue rebels fleeing back to the refugee camps. Warnings and threats have been made by both sides. Joint commissions formed by the two governments have failed in resolving this problem. 

            Reliable information would indicate that armed groups, not only Burundian rebels, are leaving the DRC and moving to Burundi via the Kigoma and Kagera regions in north-western Tanzania and the refugee camps located there.

                    Early Warning:  Burundian refugee camps in Tanzania.       

Unless the international community can persuade Tanzania to do something soon about the destabilising situation pertaining in these camps, situated within 5 km of the Burundian border (as described above), nobody should be surprised if - sooner rather than later - either ‘some unofficial elements’ from Burundi, or even more official ones, are provoked into resorting to military action against those refugee camps which are being used by the armed movements.

            The situation on the common border between Tanzanian and Burundi is virtually identical to the one which from 1994 to 1996 existed on the common border between the then Zaire and Rwanda. In that case the international community was also regularly warned by Rwanda to take action against the armed groups who were using the refugee camps just across the border in Zaire to continue launching their attacks on Rwanda.

            But the world ignored all these warnings. The result:  Rwanda invaded Zaire to solve the problem themselves.

            As the war in Burundi escalates and the prospects of a real peace decline on a daily basis, nobody should be surprised if the Rwandan example is repeated.     

            Note:  This is the third warning which has been issued in these Burundi Reports about this ongoing and festering situation pertaining on the Burundi/Tanzanian border. 

3.  Regional ethnic conflict again resurfaces as DRC ‘calms down’.

When the ‘inter-national’ Congolese war broke out in 1998, there was already a serious, although relatively low intensity war, raging in the region.  This war, between the Tutsi ethnic group (of Nilotic origin) and the Hutu ethnic group (‘mainstream’ Bantu), was playing itself out mainly in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and the DRC. 

            Although the new ’inter-national’ Congolese war took over the headlines, the regional ethnic war was only temporarily being shoved into the background.  As Congo seems to be ‘cooling down’ this other war is re-surfacing.

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            In fact, in can be argued that there never was a war between the Congolese in Congo, but that the Rwandan ethnic war was being played out on Congolese territory once the millions of refugees (and the militias guilty of the Rwandan Genocide) moved to the Congo in 1994. 

            Although Mobutu’s regime was a corrupt and dictatorial one, there was indeed hardly any war in that country.  In sharp contrast, ongoing wars and horrendous mass killings (primarily caused by ethnic and other sectarian conflicts), were the order of the day in neighbouring Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. Prior to 1996, the Congolese used to say that, compared with its eastern neighbours, Congo was a peaceful - although corrupt - ‘paradise’.

Rwandese ethnic conflict moves into Zaire.

Two events directly resulted in this ethnic war being exported to the then Zaire -especially eastern Zaire.

            Firstly.  The (Hutu) perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide of about one million mainly Tutsi Rwandese, after having resettled in the massive refugee camps of eastern DRC, continued to mount attacks on Rwanda in a seeming attempt to complete their task of ‘finishing off’ all remaining Tutsis in Rwanda.  In spite of ongoing warnings by Rwanda, neither Mobutu nor the international community took any action to remove this ‘red flag’ to the Rwandese ‘bull’.

            Secondly.  In 1996 the deputy-governor of southern Kivu in eastern Zaire ordered all ‘foreigners of Rwandese origin’, i.e. the Banyamulenge Tutsis of eastern Zaire, to leave Zaire and ‘go back home’ (Rwanda).  They forcefully resisted repatriation, claiming that they were Zaireans.

            It was these two events which not only triggered Rwanda’s direct intervention in Zaire in 1996, but also led to the removal of Mobutu, the installation of Kabila, the attempted removal of Kabila and the present regional ‘multi-national’ DRC war.

DRC war intensified ethnic division and the creation of negative regional alliances.  

While there has always been a degree of tension and even animosity in Congo (and surrounding areas) between people of mainstream Bantu origin (e.g. the Hutu) and those of Nilotic origin (e.g. the Tutsi), this animosity has grown alarmingly since the outbreak of the war against former Zairian President Mobutu in 1996 as the following analysis will illustrate.

            +   The fact that President Mobutu was ousted by the Rwandese Tutsi Government (with the support of it’s so-called ‘Tutsi sympathetic’ Ugandan ally), intensified the hatred which all Hutu and anti-Tutsi armed groups operating from the DRC had for these two countries. The removal of Mobutu, whom they considered to be

                                                                   20.

their patron, seriously undermined the ability of the Hutu rebels to attack Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi from eastern DRC, and forced most of them to relocate to north-western Tanzania or south-eastern DRC. It is for this reason that even the Burundian armed movements show a far greater hatred towards Ugandan President Museveni and Rwandan President Kagame than towards Burundian President Buyoya.  Museveni and Kagame are seen as the key role-players in the creation of a so-called  “Hima (Tutsi) Empire” in The Great Lakes Region.

            +   The attempted ousting of the new DRC President, Laurent Kabila, was interpreted in the same way by the Hutu and anti-Tutsi armed groups in DRC.

            Kabila was originally selected by Rwanda and Uganda to be the new President because they believed countries that he would, contrary to Mobutu, not support anti-Tutsi and anti-Rwandan and -Ugandan armed groups and thus create a safer environment for Tutsis in the region. But Kabila turned against his so-called Tutsi backers because he soon realised how widespread anti-Tutsi and especially anti-Rwandan sentiments were in Congo. (Having been imposed by Rwanda and Uganda, and lacking a natural power base in Congo, his political survival as new President virtually necessitated this switch). While anti-Tutsi sentiment was strongest in eastern DRC,  Tutsis were even being pursued and killed in the streets of Kinshasa once it became known that Rwanda and Uganda had tried to oust Kabila.

            The attempt by the Rwandan and Ugandan forces to oust Kabila elevated his stature to that of being the new patron of the ‘Hutu cause’. The fact that Kabila incorporated virtually all the different Hutu and anti-Tutsi armed movements into his Alliance helped to reinforce this perception and simultaneously intensified their hatred towards the two aggressors, Rwanda and Uganda.  

            +   The continued occupation of large parts of  the DRC both by the Rwandan and Ugandan Armies and Rwandese- and Ugandan-backed rebels, coupled with the behaviour of elements within these armies towards the local Hutu/Bantu population, has resulted in a degree of hatred amongst the ordinary Congolese for the Rwandese in specific and Tutsis in general that cannot be ignored.  Persistent allegations of large-scale killings of suspected Rwandese Hutu militia members and their (Rwandese and Congolese) ‘sympathisers’ by the Rwandese forces, have stoked the ethnic fires even further.  Even the Banyamulenge Tutsi of eastern Congo seem to have turned against Rwanda, saying that the behaviour of Rwandese forces in Congo has made their lives less secure.

            As this anti-Tutsi and anti-Rwandese sentiment is especially prevalent in eastern DRC, it is bound to negatively affect both the successful implementation of the Lusaka Accord and the future stability of eastern DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.  Armed groups fighting these three Governments will readily find sanctuary in this part of Congo.

            +   Leaders such as the former Laurent Kabila and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, actively promoted the ethnic division during the war by labelling the war between the DRC and Rwanda/Uganda as a war between the “Bantu” and “non-Bantu”.  This is

                                                                   21.

extremely dangerous terminology in this region. By purposefully moving away from the more country-specific terms Tutsi and Hutu and using terminology which is geographically much broader, this stimulates divisions and conflict across a much larger area of the greater central African region than is presently the case. In fact, this ‘division’ between “Bantu” and “non-Bantu” affects numerous countries and regions in Africa.

            While the “Bantu” obviously form the majority in this larger central and east African region,  African peoples of Nilotic origin (the so-called “non-Bantu”) comprise more than 20 million people. Creating conflict between the majority “Bantu” and such a substantial minority of so-called “non-Bantu” is playing with fire.

            In the short term such terminology is promoting the formation of regional alliances of armed movements comprising so-called “Bantu” (Hutu), jointly fighting the “non-Bantu”(Tutsi).  As these alliances are not country-specific, it makes it more difficult to include these armed movements in finding solutions for their individual countries. The inclusion of armed groups from e.g. Burundi and Rwanda in the Kabila/Kinshasa Alliance and the Congolese Army (FAC), has actively promoted the formation of such regional Hutu and anti-Tutsi alliances.  

The impact of the regional ethnic conflict on the Burundian peace process.

While there are signs that the United Nations is trying to move the Lusaka Accord for Congo forward, resulting in a slight cooling down of the war, it is obviously still too early to be able to evaluate whether this process in DRC is truly on track.  Whether the UN will actually be able to ‘neutralise’ the various militias in DRC (in terms of the Lusaka Accord), and whether the new Kabila Government will in practise be able/willing to prevent Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian armed groups (many of which presently are part of the Kinshasa Alliance or FAC), from continuing to use eastern Congo to attack Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, remains an open question.

            With regard to Burundi, there are indications that developments in the DRC may very likely impact negatively on the Burundian peace process:

            +   Armed groups leaving DRC are moving to Burundi.

This development seems to be motivated, firstly, by the fact that, in the near future,  it might become somewhat more difficult to freely operate  from eastern DRC (if the UN tries to implement the provisions of the Lusaka Accord which plans the arrest of armed groups).  As Burundi is not a signatory to the Lusaka Accord, these armed groups would escape any such action if they moved to Burundi. 

            Secondly, Burundi is considered to be relatively weak, compared to their other enemies (Rwanda and Uganda), as a result of the ongoing war and is therefore considered to be the ideal location for continuing the war against Rwanda and Uganda. And, as the Burundian rebels are presently seriously escalating their war against the Burundian Government, the temptation for them to first assist the Burundian rebels in toppling the

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“Tutsi regime” in Bujumbura, before moving on to Rwanda, cannot be ignored.  There are signs that some of these armed groups have recently already participated in some joint actions with the Burundian armed movements, e.g. in Bujumbura rural. Reports of armed groups moving from the DRC (into north-western Burundi) and from Tanzania (into south-eastern and eastern Burundi) in an attempt to converge on the Kibira forest, cannot just be written off. 

            +  Regional alliance of armed groups may keep Burundian rebels out of talks.

One of the main reasons why it was so important to include the two Burundian armed movements in the Burundian peace process, was to prevent them from being drawn into a  regional anti-Tutsi alliance, which has as its target not only Burundi but also Rwanda and Uganda. While it cannot be stated that they have yet joined such a regional anti-Tutsi alliance, the possibility of this happening remains and continue to grow unless they are able to join a Burundian peace process.

            It is also important to note that the two armed movements have a different degree of involvement in the regional conflict.  Due to the fact that the CNDD-FDD is a formal member of the Kinshasa forces/FAC, it has of necessity been working together with many other regional armed groups, including Rwandese. It has also always had bases in the DRC and in Tanzania.  While the regional agenda of toppling the three so-called Tutsi Governments is high on its agenda, there remains a strong sentiment that being included (as equal partners) in the peace-making efforts in Burundi, may actually be preferable.

            The PALIPEHUTU-FNL, in comparison, has been virtually uninvolved in the DRC war.  Since it left its bases in eastern Congo in 1996, it primarily relocated to Burundi, with some presence in the Tanzanian refugee camps and in Dar es Salaam.  With the exception of a short period of active co-operation between itself and the Rwandese ex-FAR a few years ago (which ended in violent conflict between the two groups), it seems that it has since been operating more independently than ‘FDD’.

            Since the escalation in the FNL’s attacks around Bujumbura, and since the development of the split within the movement, there are indications that there may be renewed co-operation between the FNL fighters around Bujumbura and other armed groups from the DRC, including Rwandese.  This may also explain their new fire power.

            +  Regional insecurity may result in joint Burundian/Rwandan military action.

Rwanda has for some time been watching developments within the Burundian peace process carefully, knowing that whatever the outcome, it will either positively or negatively impact on its own security.

            Security concerns of Rwanda.  If , as outlined above,  Rwandese, Ugandese and Burundese (anti-Tutsi) Hutu movements form an alliance and try to use Burundi as a base from which to attack Rwanda, it is very likely that Rwanda will feel compelled (due to its

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own security interests) to forget about the differences it may have with the Burundian Government, and form a joint military counter-alliance with Burundi. (While unlikely, it cannot be completely ruled out that Uganda would in some way or another support this as well).

            Political concerns of Rwanda.  With regard to the Arusha Accord Rwanda has been concerned that the Arusha Accord might go ‘too far’ and give too much power to the ‘Hutu’ parties.  Rwanda believes that many FRODEBU leaders have been negatively affected by the “Hutu Power” philosophy of the former mainly Hutu Government of Rwanda, which implemented the 1994 Genocide of mainly Tutsis, in 1994.  (Many senior Burundian FRODEBU (Hutu) leaders spend many years or were in exile in Rwanda during the previous “Hutu Power” regime in Rwanda. 

            Rwanda also believes that the Burundian PALIPEHUTU movement was formed  at the instigation of the Rwandan extremist movement PARMEHUTU,  and is therefore  of the opinion that the Burundian PALIPEHUTU also subscribes to “Hutu Power”.

            With regard to the CNDD-FDD armed movement, they mention that it was part of FRODEBU until 1994 and that it’s active collaboration with the Rwandese ex-FAR and ‘Interahamwe’ (due to their joint membership of the Kinshasa Alliance/FAC) makes them suspect.

            Rwanda’s concerns are that if these mainly Hutu Parties, leaders and Movements obtain a too strong position within the new Burundian Transitional Government and especially in the Army, that they would allow or support Rwandan armed groups using Burundi as a launching pad for attacks on Rwanda, in order to install another “Hutu Power” regime in Rwanda.

24 April 2001

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